



Jacinto Gómez López

Profesor doctor UCM

@ jacintog@ucm.es ID 0000-0002-7754-938X

José Francisco Díaz Cuesta

Profesor doctor UCM

@ jose.diaz@ucm.es ID 0000-0002-9674-7656

Francisco Javier Quiñones de la Iglesia

Jefe de servicio. Oficial del Ejército de Tierra

@ fquide@et.mde.es ID 0000-0002-0480-2786

■ Recibido / Received  
11 de agosto de 2022

■ Aceptado / Accepted  
20 de agosto de 2022

■ Páginas / Pages  
De la 223 a la 232

■ ISSN: 1885-365X

# Disinformation and hybrid warfare. Instrumentalization of informative narratives to understand the war of the 21st century

La desinformación y la guerra híbrida:  
Instrumentalización de las narrativas  
informativas para entender la guerra del siglo XXI

## ABSTRACT:

Introduction: War is as old as Humanity where communication becomes as important as traditional armies. Internet prints a novelty stamp. Prohibited in the West the word war, it is intended to be replaced by the abstract concept of strategic competition, the non-physical domains of the conflict acquire a leading role. It is intended to analyze the concept of disinformation as a weapon of the information domain.

Methodology: bibliographic review on the topics of war, disinformation, hybrid warfare and all the journalistic content that analyzes the new incorporation of computer attacks by armies.

Results: The mechanisms that are involved in disinformation in war are exposed, some of those used historically by the USSR, today Russia in the war in Ukraine and the preventive responses of the countries with specific agencies that try to counteract them. The use of algorithms, the manipulation of user websites with content designed by the subverter, the massive dissemination of false news and narratives using computer programs (bots) or human hackers that develop as users (trolls) make a force multiplier set that is not only achieved with the traditional army.

Conclusions: disinformation has been established as a mechanism of war especially in the 20th century and currently with digitalization, the phenomenon of war is presented in an aseptic, sterilized, dehumanized and cybernetic way.

## KEY WORDS:

Disinformation; informative domain; hybrid strategy; hybrid war; fake news; truth.



## RESUMEN:

Introducción: La Guerra es tan antigua como la Humanidad donde la comunicación adquiere tanta importancia como los ejércitos tradicionales. Internet imprime un sello de novedad. Proscrita en occidente la palabra guerra, se pretende sustituir por el concepto abstracto de competencia estratégica, los dominios no físicos del conflicto adquieren un papel protagonista. Se pretende analizar el concepto de desinformación como arma del dominio informativo.

Metodología: revisión bibliográfica sobre los tópicos guerra, desinformación, guerra híbrida y todos los contenidos periodísticos que analizan la nueva incorporación de los ataques informáticos por parte de los ejércitos.

Resultados: Se exponen los mecanismos que están implicados en la desinformación en la guerra, algunos de los empleados históricamente por la URSS, hoy Rusia en el conflicto bélico en Ucrania y las respuestas preventivas de los países con agencias específicas que intentan contrarrestarlos. El uso de algoritmos, manipulación de sitios web de usuarios con contenidos diseñados por el subversor, la diseminación masiva de noticias falsas y narrativas usando programas de ordenador (bots) o hackers humanos que se desarrollan como usuarios (trolls) hacen un conjunto multiplicador de fuerza que no solo se consigue con el ejército tradicional.

Conclusiones: la desinformación se ha establecido como mecanismo de guerra especialmente en el siglo xx y en actualmente con la digitalización, el fenómeno de la guerra se presenta de una forma aséptica, esterilizada, deshumanizada y cibernética.

---

## PALABRAS CLAVE:

Desinformación; dominio informativo; estrategia híbrida; guerra híbrida; *fake news*; verdad.

# 1. Introduction

After the end of the Cold War and the decomposition of the block system, Western societies once again believed that the need for war as a form of conflict resolution had disappeared. One of the factors that has possibly influenced this illusion the most has been the eruption of new information and communication technologies (ICT). These have made it possible to build a global network through which the infinite social, political and economic relations circulate that make up a system in which its members are profoundly and dangerously interdependent.

However, the system is asymmetric, since in this relationship of interdependence some members turn out to be more dependent than others. With the evidence that the displacement of the geopolitical center of gravity towards the Asia-Pacific space at the beginning of the 20th century was already a reality, it was assumed since then that friction would grow in relations between the great powers (Mersheimer, 2001, pp. 385-386). Therefore, in the face of the official liberal and multilateralist discourse in Western societies over the last two decades, the truth is that the international system is currently moving towards a more realistic framework that we suspect has never been abandoned.

War is the most painful political phenomenon to which a society can be subjected, but in the same way it is as old as Humanity (Maccionis & Plummer, 2011, p. 478). Perhaps as a transition towards its supposedly inevitable disappearance, it was thought that at least its manifestations tended inexorably towards aseptic and non-bloody forms, which, in a way, should make it more tolerable.

On February 24, 2022, the army of the Russian Federation simultaneously launched an offensive on Ukraine from four different directions; the deaths on both sides are already counted in thousands and the number of refugees and displaced persons in millions. According to Clausewitz's theory, war, in its most Clausewitzian form, «a continuation of politics by other



means» (that is, organized violence), has reappeared in all its harshness in the Eurasian space, something that for the average citizen seemed unthinkable.

From a polemological perspective or study of war, not a few authors have failed to emphasize that the war had not lost one iota of its value as an instrument of power and that, therefore, its purpose would continue to be that of the policy to which it obeys (Quiñones, *New Post-Cold War Conflicts*, 2017, p. 11). On the other hand, what has happened is that the same factors that were expected to make war unnecessary have opened up new fields for war action. Under these conditions, the domains in which the war will take place in the near future will manifest a clear expansion from the traditional spheres of physical nature, land, sea and air, towards other non-physical ones that seem to acquire even greater importance, such as the fact of hybrid warfare after the appearance of the internet.

One of these last areas is information, which contemplates a wide range of capabilities with which to expand military power beyond physical environments, without a solution of continuity with these, to begin to exploit the possibilities of information and knowledge systems (Caballero, 2003, p. 256). Due to constant technological innovation, currently, the rate of possibilities in the information domain grows exponentially.

However, due to the imprecision of many of these contents, and their difficulty to conceptualize, in Western security literature it has been accepted to include them under the vague term of hybrid warfare (Quiñones, *A review of the hybrid actor/hybrid threat concept*, 2020). Within the framework of hybrid warfare, as artificial as it is media effective, disinformation undoubtedly emerges as one of its essential components. However, as its use is expansive as well as imprecise, it encourages the uninitiated audience to confuse it with the expression false news or fake news in English.

From a systemic approach, certain actors of the international system appear who make regular use of disinformation even in their foreign policy. From the Western perspective of international relations, some authors refer to them as revisionists of the status quo, which is also a disputed aspect (Schweller, 2015).

An initial approximation to the concept of information would present it to us as the set of data that the sender and receiver exchange through a channel. The meaning of said interaction will be provided by the code, which must be known by both for the information to make sense. Finally, the context finishes configuring the communication process. On the contrary, the term disinformation already harbors a malicious intent, a premeditated desire to cause harm or harm to someone. In addition, it does not refer to the absence of information, as could be deduced from the lexical point of view, nor is it a distorted image of that, similar to the one that a certain type of curved mirror returns of the object located in front of it. On the other hand, we could indeed interpret it as contradictory in terminis of the root term, the one that perverts.

After the previous exposition of the contextual framework, the rest of this work will be organized as follows. In the first place, we will analyze how disinformation can be militarized and that, in fact, it works as a capacity of the information space and how narrative constructions can profoundly condition the perceptions of the receiver and that, within the framework of communication processes, certain actors of the system international use of them as support for disinformation. Next, as a case study, it will be verified how Russia has traditionally used disinformation with offensive intent to benefit its foreign policy objectives.





## 2. Material and methods

An exhaustive review of the bibliography has been carried out according to hybrid warfare and especially disinformation in times of war since the beginning of the 20th century, focusing on the environment of the extinct USSR and current Russia. It has sought to bring the reader closer to the aspects related to disinformation in times of war, its main tactics, as well as its origin and causes and the substantial changes that have been revealed in the current conflict in Ukraine. Preventive strategies have also been discussed. The results have been presented within a narrative essay.

## 3. Results

The strategies of disinformation as a weapon in the information domain and how they have been developed from the beginning of the 20th century to the present in the war and pre-war conflicts where the extinct USSR and currently Russia have been involved are exposed below.

Due to the competition of new technologies (Gómez-López, 2020), it seems unquestionable that this second decade of the 21st century, known as the Information Age, is also that of disinformation. However, far from constituting a new phenomenon, the current wave of disinformation would already be the fourth since it appeared as such in the early twenties of the last century. Although the fundamental principles remain, new technologies and the internet have de-professionalized (sic) the old art of influence while accelerating its pace and moderation (Rid, 2021, pp. 10-11).

Contrary to what a large part of the public opinion will understand by disinformation, this is not simply false information or Fake News or, at least, not necessarily.

A famous case of early disinformation operations was the famous Zinoviev letter, known as the red letter, published in the British media in 1924. Presumably written by Grigori Zinoviev and addressed to the Central Committee of the British Communist Party, it sparked a scandal that caused the fall of the labor government of Ramsey McDonald and prevented the ratification of the cooperation treaties that had been agreed with the Soviet Union (Benett, 1999, p. 1). Behind all this was the fear of an armed insurrection in the country promoted by communism. In the same way as it did a century ago, disinformation seeks to erode the foundations of open systems by first attacking the trust of citizens in their institutions. A liberal order cannot exist without transparency, so in order for the handover of government powers not to be traumatic after an election, citizen confidence in the political infrastructure, the vote counting system, media coverage, etc., is essential. The famous Soviet Cold War active measures, which will be discussed later, were designed for this purpose. In the same way, the current disinformation operations promoted by the heirs of that time pursue similar objectives.

Propaganda was part of the tools used not only by the aforementioned active measures but also by the principles of revolutionary warfare and psychological warfare. In all these areas, propaganda included: «[Both] the dissemination of information and ideas with the aim of getting the adversary to act in a certain way or adopt a certain course of action favorable to one's own interests» (Nordquist, 2019). Fake news has always existed in the form of propaganda, tendentious headlines or spreading fear in public opinion about sensitive and





specific issues. Despite this, from the current point of view of the receiving individual, it is easy to understand that they tend to assimilate the term Fake News with propaganda, which is not correct. But more dangerous is the lack of awareness of the fact that the former does not communicate a precise idea of the magnitude of the problem that open societies are faced with today.

However, what radically changes the current landscape is the speed and scope with which deliberately falsified accounts reach the citizen (EBU, 2018, p. 5). It can be easily deduced that the differential factor has been technology, as present today in the life of the average citizen as the written press was until just a couple of decades ago.

Similar to the traditional press, which only required from the user a not necessarily exhaustive knowledge of written language, social networks and online information platforms also do not require a specific technical qualification from the user. In addition, the machine-user interfaces are ingeniously designed from an ergonomic point of view to make them simpler and more attractive, since they are supported by psychological mechanisms that reinforce the user's digital addiction.

On the contrary, unlike the radio or written media in which the publisher is legally responsible for the published content, there is no equivalent responsibility for those distributed on social networks or social media. In this way, it is much easier, cheaper, faster and safer for any interested actor to use the Internet to disseminate false news which, as we have already mentioned, can form part of a more elaborate disinformation campaign.

Along these lines, organizations such as the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) interpret the term fake news as: «the intentional creation and/or dissemination of false or misleading news on social networks and similar platforms, whether for political or other reasons.» (EBU, 2018, p. 6). It is interesting to underline the circumscription of the term to the digital medium as an archetype of the omnipresent technological element on which the world of communication currently revolves and, consequently, that of disinformation. The EBU approach to the fake news phenomenon is extraordinarily similar to the generic concept of disinformation, which is why, consequently, this organization recommends using the term online disinformation; which is much more accurate and evocative of the threat. However, misinformation, although it turns out to be the core of the problem, is only one part of what the EBU calls information chaos (EBU, 2018, p. 6).

Digitization applied to communication has made it possible for pieces of information to travel the world practically in real time. While it is true that this opens up unlimited possibilities for the transmission and expansion of knowledge, it also opens up its dark side. The need for immediate information due to digital addiction is known as FOMO (Fear of Missing Out) and unfortunately it tends to prevail over the substantiated but deferred analysis (Sampedro, 2021, p. 3).

For security and defense organizations and institutions, the multiple threats configured in digital format that are included in the non-physical spheres of warfare constitute a nightmare. The possibility of a digital Pearl Harbor became apparent in 2007 in the aftermath of the massive Denial of Service (DoS) cyberattack on Estonian government servers. This attack offered a model of the methodology that the authors of this type of actions would follow in the future and that currently, both in the popular and academic spheres, are included under the vague term of hybrid threats (Juurvee & Mattiisen, 2020, p. 37).





Although the common thread of the events led to the security services of the Russian Federation, the truth is that it was not possible to clarify with certainty whether the DoS attacks were to be attributed to Russian-speaking activists, the Russian security apparatus or cooperation between the two. What was beginning to be suspected is that the Internet seemed to be purposely designed for disinformation even before the expansion of social networks (Rid, 2021, pp. 343-345).

The trigger for the Estonian case was the announcement by the government of this country in August 2007 of its intention to move a statue commemorating the entry of the Red Army into Tallinn in September 1944. The symbolism of the statue was bivalent, since for some it represented the liberation of the Nazi occupation, while for others it was the Soviet occupation.

The militarization of the narrative about the meaning of that statue served as fuel for social confrontation from January of that year, and set off alarm bells about the danger that this course of action poses to national security. The militarization of the narrative seeks to undermine identities, generate confusion and provoke the political and social fracture of the target societies (Allenby & Garreau). Given the wide spectrum of its objectives, responsibility can only lead to actors located at the systemic level, which means state actors. Russia, for example, has shown great skill in using the post-factual approach of its political culture for the militarization of narratives. Such an approach delivered excellent results in 2014 with the annexation of the Crimean peninsula in Ukraine and is currently keeping the Baltic countries under constant pressure. However, it does not appear to have worked as successfully in the 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

The Russian Security Services have made extensive use since the early days of the Revolution of what would come to be known as active measures (aktivniye meropriyatiya) both abroad and within the country. Its antecedents could even be found in the practices of the former tsarist secret police. Although the term in principle takes us back to the times of the Cold War, there is sufficient agreement among specialists that Russia has returned to those technical tactics and procedures, but conveniently updated to the digital medium of the 21st century (Galleoti, 2019).

Department X was the disinformation operations unit within the HVA, the foreign intelligence branch of the Stassi (the German Democratic Republic's equivalent of the KGB). The X, pronounced ten, was a top-secret department of a highly secretive unit that itself belonged to a highly discreet organization. During most of the Cold War, the ten was commanded by Rolf Waggenbreth, who was not authorized to speak about the tasks of his Department until 1986, and that only before a group of Stassi cadres. In that conference, Waggenbreth stated to his colleagues that: «There is a profession that I especially appreciate, a profession that can get away with almost everything and that group is our beloved journalists» (Rid, 2021, p. 207).

Waggenbreth's statement made sense. Journalists, especially investigative journalists, take care to count among their contacts a large list of officials, academics, and professionals with access to information that is generally not available in open sources. Intelligence services and journalists feed on the same raw material: information.

For this reason, both have contracted a kind of symbiotic relationship that reached its maximum expression in the field of active measures. So much so that the head of Department X came to formulate, obviously rhetorically, the following question: «what would active measures be without journalists?» (Rid, 2021, p. 208). Three decades later, the question that perhaps we should ask ourselves is: what would active measures be without the Internet?



At the beginning of the 1960s, the intelligence services of the former Soviet Union (USSR) divided their operations into what they called passive measures, basically obtaining documents, and active measures. The latter obtained priority and their main function was to disseminate disinformation as a fundamental capacity to support their foreign policy (Marín, 2022, p. 8).

In the current conflict in Ukraine, the use of artificial intelligence algorithms, the manipulation of websites that connect users to the hacker, the mass dissemination of fake news and narratives through computer programs (bots) or human hackers that develop as users (trolls) make up a powerful force multiplier set in times of war, something that is being seen in a general way in the Russian action in Ukraine. This can generate a military arsenal also on the individual or target groups so that the capacity of assimilation is obvious and makes them unable to differentiate reality from generated or fictional content.

Regarding preventive strategies that have tried to control these disinformation processes, a first step was the creation of a committee known as AMWG (Active Measures Working Group); created at the time of the Reagan mandate, it was one of the first structures to fight against disinformation. This committee had as its main objective Soviet disinformation. After the disappearance of the USSR, the KGB would be redirected towards new objectives, such as ensuring the permanence of the Soviet status quo and preserving the existing power structures, according to Abrams (Abrams, 2016).

Despite the fact that the Russian Federation's foreign policy and strategic documents are accessible, the objectives became abundantly clear in 2008 following its military intervention in Georgia. From then until the recent invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, through the de facto annexation of Crimea and parts of the Lugansk and Donetsk oblasts in eastern Ukraine in 2014, all support the forward-looking opinion that the AMWG issued exactly thirty years.

## 4. Discussion and Conclusions

In relation to the strategic value of narratives as a support for disinformation, we must point out that for a communicative process to take place there must be a reason, in addition to the existence of a social group or network that shares the same code. The cause usually appears in the existence of common interests or ideology, which use narratives as immaterial support for the group (Jordán & Calvo, *El nuevo rostro de la guerra*, 2005, p. 129). The story provides consistency to the narrative construct as it stems from uses, customs or events firmly installed in the collective identity of the group. As a consequence, and regardless of its historiographical or mythological origin, the story carries an identity meaning for the receiver, who identifies it as their own.

As in the literary genre from which it takes its name, the elaboration of narratives requires a logical structure since, as we have explained, they are inspired by events well known by the target audience. However, as its intention is to reach the heart of the emotional system of said audience, its effects are manifested fundamentally in the mythos or story to the detriment of the logos or human capacity, so that, properly modeled, they can condition the rational thinking of the individual or group. The specifically constructed narratives are therefore highly sensitive information carriers for the target audience. This is particularly true in the case of



dominant groups, which are firmly established in the discourse through identity narratives (Villarroya, 1997, pp. 210-214). In this way, the narratives contribute to strengthening the power of the issuer, who will cost less effort and resources to impose their program. At a macro level, certain actors in the international system do not hesitate to make offensive but intelligent use of narratives as one more component of their military arsenal.

In this way, narratives have the power to become a powerful mechanism of power, as well as, once militarized, a weapon. Accordingly, we will be able to establish a clear connection between the (militarized) narrative and propaganda, as the latter component of what in military manuals was known as psychological warfare. However, both terms are currently associated with the features that characterize hybrid warfare; a concept that is discussed, as Dr. Guillem Collom warns: «it is an attractive and novel concept, although as a theory it runs the risk of losing its meaning and becoming irrelevant» (Collom, 2018, p. 8).

In other words, the narrative is presented in a coherent, understandable and credible way, but despite appearing to be true, it does not have to be, since what is important is what the audience believes to be real (Soldevilla, 2018). This quality of narratives of creating their own realities is the facet that has earned them their strategic value where the value asset is not what is communicated but how it is done. Likewise, they can become a weapon with unpredictable effects because by establishing their own referents, manufactured ad hoc, they will end up disconnecting their audiences from the real ones.

Until now, the word war had de facto disappeared from communication channels in the Western world in general. However, war, in its purest Clausewitzian sense, has once again revealed itself to the West for the reality that it is. Considered as a fact of the distant past by the globalization process, the tragedy in Ukraine unleashed by the Russian Federation has shown the opposite. The invasion of Ukraine has turned out to be a reality check for European voluntarism and an alarm bell to review its security policies.

In conclusion, we could say that the disinformation phenomenon has been established as a war mechanism since the beginning of the 20th century and that in this current era of information where ideas are transmitted quickly throughout the planet and easily, in a new environment in which everything seems to be modeled by digitization, even the phenomenon of war appears to the receiving subject as a new reality; aseptic, sterilized, dehumanized, cybernetic. As Clausewitz wrote, war is a chameleon that takes different forms depending on the time, the context and the values and beliefs of the societies that wage it. Every war is different, but its nature is not. As it cannot be otherwise, immutable over the centuries to the changes in the world, the nature of war remains unchanged. As a product of the will, its nature is political, while as an object it is instrumental to political power.

## 5. References

- Abrams, S. (2016). Beyond propaganda: Soviet active measures in Putin's Russia. *Connections: The Quarterly Journal*, 15(1), 5-31. <http://bit.ly/3ZTrPgC>
- Allenby, B. y Garreau, J. (3/1/2017). *Weaponized narrative is the new battlespace*. Defence One. <http://bit.ly/3XyiwB2>
- Bennett, G. (1999). The Zinoviev Letter of 1924: «A most extraordinary and mysterious business». *History Notes*, 14. [www.fco.gov.uk](http://www.fco.gov.uk)





- Bouthoul, G. (1971). *La guerra*. Vilassar de Mar: Oikos-Tau.
- Britannica (23 de abril de 2020). *Guerra*. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/war>
- Caballero, F. S. (2003). La guerra en la era de la información: Propaganda, violencia simbólica y desarrollo panóptico del sistema global de comunicación. *Sphera Publica*, 3. [www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=29700314](http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=29700314)
- Cimora, B. (2021). *La caída del imperio soviético*. Madrid: Actas.
- Clarín (8/12/2016). ¿Vivimos la era más sanguinaria de la historia? <http://bit.ly/3HrjYzR>
- Clausewitz, C. von (1978). *De la guerra*. Madrid: Ediciones Ejército.
- Collom, G. (enero de 2018). *Contextualizando la guerra híbrida*. Real Instituto Elcano. [www.realinstitutoelcano.org/cibers/ciber-elcano-no-32/](http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/cibers/ciber-elcano-no-32/)
- Galeoti, M. (junio de 2019). *Active measures: Russia's covert geopolitical operations*. George C. Marshall. <http://bit.ly/3QZtX2d>
- Gómez, J. (julio de 2019). Tecnologías de la información y los mensajes en los nuevos espectros del conflicto. *Revista de Ciencias de la Comunicación e Información*, 24(2), 45-56. <https://www.revistaccinformacion.net/index.php/rcci/article/view/109>
- Jordán, J. y Calvo, J. L. (2005). *El nuevo rostro de la guerra*. Navarra: Universidad de Navarra.
- Juurvee, I. y Mattiisen, M. (agosto de 2020). *The bronze soldier crisis of 2007: Revisiting an early case of hybrid conflict*. International Centre for Defence and Security. <https://bit.ly/3iRyeZe>
- Krauthammer, C. (1990/91). The unipolar moment. *Foreign Affairs*, 70(1).
- Macionis, J. y Plummer, K. (2011). *Sociología*. Madrid: Pearson.
- Maggioni, M. y Magri, P. (01 de 01 de 2015). Twitter and Jihad: the communication strategy of ISIS. *Journal of Cyberspace Studies*, 2(2), 239-241. <https://doi.org/10.22059/jcss.2018.66728>
- Marín, F. (21 de marzo de 2022). ¿Comprendemos la desinformación?: Rusia y la evolución de las medidas. Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos. <https://bit.ly/3ZXI25p>
- Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001). *The tragedy of great powers politics*. Nueva York: W. W. Norton & Company.
- Nordquist, R. (16/02/2019). *Definition and examples of propaganda*. ThoughtCo. [www.thoughtco.com/propaganda-definition-1691544](http://www.thoughtco.com/propaganda-definition-1691544)
- Quiñones, F. J. (17/03/2017). *Un examen de las causas profundas de los conflictos en la Posguerra Fría. Actores civiles y militares: Diferentes aproximaciones*. Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos. [www.ieee.es/contenido/noticias/2017/03/DIEEEO30-2017.html](http://www.ieee.es/contenido/noticias/2017/03/DIEEEO30-2017.html)
- Quiñones, F. J. (30/11/2020). *Una revisión del concepto actor híbrido/amenaza híbrida*. Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos. <https://bit.ly/3XDriOw>
- Quiroz, N. F. (2021). La polemología como aporte metodológico para profundizar la historia de la guerra. *Revista Científica General José María Córdova*, 19(35). <https://doi.org/10.21830/19006586.785>
- Rid, T. (2021). *Desinformación y guerra política*. Barcelona: Crítica.
- Sampedro, R. (9/03/2021). *Redes sociales: Desinformación, adicción y seguridad*. Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos. <https://bit.ly/3WBEC4q>
- Schweller, R. (7/07/2015). *Rising powers and revisionism in emerging international orders*. Valdai Discussion Club. <http://bit.ly/3XNYfHx>
- Soldevilla, G. F. (5/06/2018). La importancia del relato. *El Diario Vasco*. [www.diariovasco.com/opinion/importancia-relato-20180504215614-nt.html](http://www.diariovasco.com/opinion/importancia-relato-20180504215614-nt.html)
- UER (18/04/2018). *Fake news and the information disorder*. <https://www.ebu.ch/news/2018/04/fake-news-and-the-information-disorder>



